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The terms equality and equity are widely con fused. Despite their phonetic similarity and philological connections, they are quite distinct. The equality of a distri bution of income or wealth is basically a matter of fact and is, therefore, basically objective. The equity of the same distribution is basically a matter of ethical judgment and is, therefore, basically subjective. The discussion attempts to avoid extraneous issues, such as whether the particular poor— at any time or place—are apt to be morally superior, or in ferior, to the particular rich; and whether economic, as dis tinguished from ethical, maldistribution can cause, or has caused, economic depression. The paper begins with the valiant attempts by the marginal-utility economists of the turn of the century to frame an objective case for income equali zation and with A. P. Lerner's later extension of this case. It then moves on to the rebuttals of conservative opponents. Three more recent attempts—under the headings of ( 1 ) inter dependent utility functions, (2) limiting the domain of in equality and (3) John Rawls' recent theory of justice in generalized ethics—are then summarized. The discussion ends, however, on a skeptical note.

The terms equality & equity are widely confused. Despite their phonetic similarity & philological connections, they are quite distinct. The equality of a distribution of income or wealth is basically a matter of fact & is, therefore, basically objective. The discussion attempts to avoid extraneous issues, such as whether the particular poor at any time or place are apt to be morally superior, or inferior, to the particular rich; & whether econ as distinguished from ethical maldistribution can cause, or has caused, econ depression. The valiant attempts by the marginal utility econ'ts of the turn of the cent to frame an objective case for income equalization are discussed, as well as A. P. Lerner's later extension of this case. The rebuttals of conservative opponents are then reviewed. 3 more recent attempts under the headings of (1) interdependent utility functions, (2) limiting the domain of inequality & (3) John Rawls' recent theory of justice in generalized ethics are then summarized. The discussion ends, however, on a skeptical note. HA.

A series of equality and equity measures has been introduced by the British Government to tackle the seemingly intractable problems of Northern Ireland. These measures represent a range of initiatives in the areas of social need, fair employment, education reform and community relations. The implementation of the community relations programme is considered in some detail as a case study in improving equality and equity in Northern Ireland. Qualitative data from community relations officers, charged with implementing the policy, are examined in the light of problems encountered with the programme. The influences on delivering community relations, as one component of this comprehensive thrust to attain equality and equity, are also considered using an explanatory model. The article concludes that changes in attitudes and behaviour between the two communities are occurring, albeit slowly, promoted by the measures described. © 1994, Taylor & Francis Group, LLC. All rights reserved.

This article introduces the special issue focused on equality and equity in deliberative democracy. The essay proposes some initial working definitions of equity and equality and offers reasons why scholars and practitioners should attend to both. We outline the basic structure of the issue's three sections and preview the contributors' articles, with special attention to the opportunities and the challenges of achieving equality and equity within the deliberative system.

This article introduces the special issue focused on equality and equity in deliberative democracy. The essay proposes some initial working definitions of equity and equality and offers reasons why scholars and practitioners should attend to both. We outline the basic structure of the issue's three sections and preview the contributors' articles, with special attention to the opportunities and the challenges of achieving equality and equity within the deliberative system.

Engelmann and Strobel (AER 2004) question the relevance of inequity aversion in simple dictator game experiments claiming that a combination of a preference for efficiency and a Rawlsian motive for helping the least well-off is more important than inequity aversion. We show that these results are partly based on a strong subject pool effect. The participants of the E&S experiments were undergraduate students of economics and business administration who self-selected into their field of study (economics) and learned in the first semester that efficiency is desirable. We show that for non-economists the preference for efficiency is much less pronounced. We also find a non-negligible gender effect indicating that women are more egalitarian than men. However, perhaps surprisingly, the dominance of equality over efficiency is unrelated to political attitudes.

This article introduces the special issue focused on equality and equity in deliberative democracy. The essay proposes some initial working definitions of equity and equality and offers reasons why scholars and practitioners should attend to both. We outline the basic structure of the issue's three sections and preview the contributors' articles, with special attention to the opportunities and the challenges of achieving equality and equity within the deliberative system.

AbstractAmerican politicians repeatedly and strenuously invoke concerns about fairness when pitching their trade policies to their constituents, unsurprisingly since fairness is one of the most fundamental and universal moral concepts. Yet studies to date on public opinion about trade have not been designed in such a way that they test whether fairness is important, nor whether the mass public applies fairness standards impartially. Drawing on findings in social psychology and behavioral economics, we develop and find evidence for an "asymmetric fairness" argument. In a national survey of Americans, we find strong evidence that fairness, conceived in terms of equality, is crucial for understanding support for potential trade deals and support for renegotiating existing ones. Americans view as most fair and most preferable outcomes in which concessions and benefits are equal across countries, especially when those equal benefits match productivity. However, we find that Americans have an egoistically biased sense of fairness, responding particularly negatively to any outcome that leaves the United States relatively worse off—a sense of injustice that does not extend to the same degree to relative gains for Americans.

AbstractThe New Development Bank (NDB) and the BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) were built by Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (the BRICS countries) in response to the 'disappointing' Bretton Woods Institutions, including the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The main difference between the Bretton Woods Institutions and the BRICS institutions is that the latter adopts an equal‐weight system instead of a weighted voting system in the NDB (all five BRICS countries have equal shares and voting weights regardless of the major differences in their economic weights) and uses consensus instead of majority voting rules to make decisions regarding critical issues in the CRA. In fact, both the equal‐weight system and consensus rule are unprecedented in the history of multilateral financial institutions. The World Bank, the IMF, the Asian Development Bank and even the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) all adopt weighted voting systems and majority voting rules. We explain why the BRICS countries adopt these unprecedented designs through precise power measurements and carefully designed experiments. First, we measure the voting power of each member of the BRICS' NDB and CRA under the current decision‐making systems, using this information as a control group. Then, we remeasure the voting power of each member of the NDB under the assumption that their shares and voting weights are allocated according to their economic weights; additionally, we remeasure the voting power of each country of the CRA under the assumption that majority rules are adopted when decisions are being made on critical issues. Moreover, we establish evaluation indices of power equality and power equity based on classic and variant Gini coefficients and Lorenz curves and use them to assess and compare the power structures of the BRICS' NDB and CRA in the contexts of different voting weight reallocations and different voting rules redesigns. We use these indices to precisely analyse whether the power structures of the BRICS institutions become more equable or equitable in the examined contexts and to investigate the relationship between equality and equity in this setting.